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COURT OF APPEALS, 1960 TERM
admissible under the test established in Van Gaasbeck. They require a proper
foundation, establishing that the testimony sought would pertain only to a
particular, relevant trait. Also properly excluded, on the grounds that it
pertained not to reputation but sought evidence as to prior acts which could
only be admissible if offered to show defendant's state of mind at the time of
the alleged crime, was "Have you had any trouble with the defendant?"
32
Also excluded was the question, "Did you know defendant's reputation for
soberness, is it good or bad?" While the question may have been improper in
form, since it is necessary to establish knowledge of reputation before an opinion
can be elicited as to its nature, it probably should have been admitted along
with "Do you know his reputation for peacefulness?" It is clear that these
questions would have been admitted if they were in the form of "Did you hear
of" or "Have you heard."
33
It is clear, however, that evidence as to reputation of the defendant's
relevant character traits should be admitted and that its exclusion may
constitute reversible error. Therefore, it is submitted that when questions
pertaining to character and reputation are excluded, it would be good practice
for the trial judge to indicate exactly where the objection lies so that the
pertinent evidence may be admitted.
R.E.N.
EXPERT NEED NOT TESTIFY AS TO THE REASONS FOR HIS OPINION
The question presented in People v. Crossland34 is whether an expert
witness is required to state the reasons for his opinion on direct examination in
a prosecution for possession of policy slips. The Court of Appeals, unanimously
reversing the Appellate Division,3 5 held that a police officer, testifying as an
expert, is not required to explain the technical basis of his opinion as part of
the People's case.
The State produced one witness, a police officer, who testified that he had
observed defendant Crossland on a certain day receive a slip of paper and
money from defendant Davis, and that he had been able to retrieve the slip
of paper from the defendants. The slip of paper was introduced into evidence.
The officer, a qualified expert on policy slips, "then testified that in his opinion
the writings on the slip of paper represented 17 'plays' on mutuel race horse
policy." This constituted the People's case, and defendant Crossland was
convicted for possession of policy slips.
The Appellate Division reversed this conviction on the basis of People v.
Pierson,3 6 People v. Oak,37 and People v. Harris.38 In these cases convictions
32. See Dallas R. & T. Co. v. Farnsworth, 148 Tex. 584, 227 S.W.2d 1071 (1950).
33. Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469 (1948).
34, 9 N.Y.2d 464, 214 N.Y.S.2d 728 (1961).
35. 12 A.D.2d 467, 208 N.Y.S.2d 902 (lst Dep't 1960).
36. 279 App. Div. 509, 111 N.Y.S.2d 39 (1st Dep't 1952).
37. 283 App. Div. 1018, 131 N.Y.S.2d 339 (1st Dep't 1954).
38. 1 A.D.2d 821, 150 N.Y.S.2d 151 (1st Dep't 1956).
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were reversed and new trials ordered because the police officer as an expert
witness merely gave on direct examination his opinion on the nature of the
transactions and did not explain the reasons for this opinion; namely, what
mutuel policy involves and the nature of the wagering involved. The rationale
for these holdings was, as explained in People v. Pierson, to enable a trial court
and a reviewing court to determine whether or not the defendant was guilty of
the specific crime with which he was charged. "The courts should be advised
not only of the facts upon which an expert bases his conclusions, but also an
explanation of those facts in order to determine whether or not such conclusions
are well-founded."3 9
The Court of Appeals specifically overruled the three aforementioned
Appellate Division cases and rejected their rationale. The Court adhered to
the proposition that an expert opinion may not be based upon fdcts which were
not properly admitted into evidence.40 However, the Court pointed out that
in the instant case the facts were properly in evidence; therefore, an expert
opinion based upon those facts was proper. However, the Court rejected the
thesis advanced by the Appellate Division, that the prosecution must, as part
of the People's case, have the expert explain why he reaches his conclusions from
the facts in evidence. The State may, if it so desires, inquire into the reasons
for the expert's opinion, but there is no compulsion to do so. 41 Furthermore,
defense counsel is free on cross-examination to probe the technical basis of the
expert's opinion and to use any other methods generally available to impeach
the expert witness. Therefore, the expert's opinion need not go untested.
Thus on direct examination, an unexplained expert opinion based on the
expert's personal observation or on facts properly in evidence is all that is
required. It is not necessary to explain why the facts lead to the ultimate
conclusion or opinion. This is the general rule regarding expert testimony, and
there is no apparent reason why an exception should be made in those cases
dealing with policy convictions. It is true that an opinion, reinforced with
the reasons for reaching that opinion, may carry greater probative force than
the mere assertion of an opinion without further explanation; however, this
tactical consideration and the risk of non-persuasion is properly in the control
of the party producing the expert witness. Similarly, the opposing party may
challenge the validity of the opinion by cross-examining the expert as to his
reasons for reaching the opinion. Thus, the burden of revealing whether the
expert's opinion is well-founded rests with the parties to the litigation rather than
in a rule of law.
P. A. L.
39. People v. Pierson, supra note 36 at 513, 111 N.Y.S.2d at 44.
40. People v. Samuels, 302 N.Y. 163, 96 N.E.2d 757 (1951); People v. Strait, 148
N.Y. 566, 42 N.E. 1045 (1896).
41. Johnson Service Co. v. MacLernon, 142 App. Div. 677, 127 N.Y. Supp. 431 (1st
Dep't 1911).
